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ABSTRACT
This monograph presents a method for analyzing the potential
RF susceptibility to the electrical components and systems used in typical
space vehciles. It presents the philosophy, applicability and limitat-
tions of this approach. While not exhaustive, enough mathematics is
presented to permit analysis of a very large percentage of the types of
problems which normally occur. Where the actual development of equations
is not given in detail, suitable references are provided. Familiarization
with the test and the cited references should provide the reader with the
necessary information to analyze most systems and the general procedures
to handle those situations which are beyond the scope of this monograph.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The determination of the potential radio frequency (RF)
hazard to any system exposed to an incident RF field is a very complex
problem. Consider, for example, a typical electroexplosive device
(EED) and its associated firing circuit mounted in a missile. To begin
with, the missile may be transported to the launch site with some or all
of its circuits installed and could conceivably be exposed to a wide
variety of RF signals along the way. At the launch site it may be
necessary to install some of the EEDs or electronic components while in
an RF environment. This would permit the possibility of the individual
components being irradiated during handling and, subsequently, after in-
stallation in its circuit. In addition check out procedures often
result in altering the circuits, connecting temporary new circuits to
the potentially vulnerable component and such actions as the opening
and closing of vents and ports in the missile skin. Furthermore, there
would probably be constant movement of vehicles and personnel in the
area and this movement would cause continual fluctuation in local RF
field intensities. All of these factors would contribute to a con-
stantly changing and very difficult to define set of conditions with
respect to RF hazards. It should be noted that localized field in-
tensity conditions can exceed the overall field intensity that would
be determined by measuring the field produced at a given point by a
radiating transmitter. Unless one can measure the field at the exact
point of interest, under the actual conditions and with all equipment
that will be in the area and without serious perturbation of the field
by the measuring equipment one can be certain only of an approximation
of the actual field conditions.
Even if one could accomplish a testing program which would
cover all of the conditions, the inherent variation from missile to
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missile would introduce another large variable. Slight changes in the
arrangement of the wiring or in the orientation of the missile with
respect to the RE field might well produce large variations in the amount
of RE energy delivered to the device under investigation, identical
electrical impedance conditions cannot be maintained from missile to
missile and on board transmitters may directly interact with the
vulnerable circuits.
Of course, if the circuit designer were free to design his
circuits with nothing else in mind but to make them insensitive to RE,
the RF problem could be essentially eliminated. Complete continuous
shielding of the entire systems would in general reduce RY levels at
the components to safe values. However, this is often almost impossible,
for in our modern complex electric circuits it is usually necessary to
break branch circuits out of the shield, to terminate on circuit boards
open to RF signals or to follow other procedures which compromise RF
safety. In addition, other design groups may argue for and obtain
different concepts for wiring to accomplish their ends, and in so doing
may also seriously compromise the RF protection.
On the other hand it is often suggested that even with cir-
cuits poorly designed from the RE viewpoint, there have been relatively
few accidents directly attributed to RE and therefore the problem must
be negligible. This could be a very dangerous viewpoint. First of all,
information on accidents of any nature is usually very poorly dissemi-
nated so that it is difficult to know what accidents have occurred and
what situations surrounded such accidents. This is particularly true
of accidents which do not result in severe injury to personnel or very
large property damage. Second, the determination of the cause of an
accident after it has happened is a very difficult business. This is
particularly true when trying to evaluate the after-the-fact influence
of anything as variable as the potential RF hazard. Furthermore if the
investigators do not fully understand how RF energy can be transferred
they will easily miss many possibilities. Third, at the present time
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most RF f_elds in proximity of vulnerable systems are of
reasonably low intensity or are turned off during possibly critical
periods. Every year, however, the RF environmental levels are increas-
ins, and RF silence may not always be possible. Systems which are now
marginal may eventually become quite vulnerable.
With all of these complicating and generally uncontrollable
factors, how can one even evaluate the potential RF hazard to any
critical system? Unfortunately, the answer at the present state-of-the-
art is that it cannot be done with great precision for anything but a
very specifically defined case; however, the hazard can sometimes be
evaluated in such a manner that it can be conclusively stated that no
hazard exists if this should be the case.
Two methods are now in general use. Both of these require
that the RF sensitivity of the device in question be known. There are
laboratory techniques for determining this with reasonable precision;
unfortunately, the RF sensitivity is of the device is not always so
determined and this in general will negate the effectiveness of either
method unless suitable precautions are taken.
The first method, stated briefly, is to directly radiate the
system in question with a variety of high powered transmitters and to
observe the RF levels that arrive at the device under test. The method
is appealing, if expensive, since it is a direct approach which super-
ficially appears to simulate the actual conditions that will occur.
But, while such tests are much used, and have a definite place in the
scheme of things, there are many pitfalls that generally make them un-
satisfactory for a really valid hazard determination. The chief weak-
nesses of the method include inadequacy of present RF detectors, in-
ability to determine field strengths accurately, the very large expense
of suitably powerful transmitters, the risk of assuming that tests on
one or two systems can be extended to all such systems and the lack of
complete understanding by most field testers of the mechanisms of RF
damage on the vulnerable devices.
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To minimize the effect of these various problems, irradiation
tests are often conducted with an arbitrary safety factor added to the
acceptable RF pick up at the detector. Many times this factor is not
large enough for all conditions. In addition it should be recognized
that the only positive result of a field irradiation is to demonstrate
that a hazard exists for certain frequencies, irradiation angles,
polarizations and orientations of the irradiating antenna and the
system being irradiated. Specifically a field irradiation test can
never assure complete RF safety since only a finite number of frequencies,
polarizations, etc., can be tested from the literally infinite number
of situations that can develop in the actual use of the system. How-
ever, properly conducted, field tests can give considerable reassurance
regarding RF safety.
The second method is the application of analytical techniques
to the systems to determine the extent of RF hazard. This approach in
its present form has two distinct advantages: first, properly conducted
the results are always on the safe side, and should it be demonstrated
by this approach that a system is safe in a given field and at a
specific frequency, its safety can practically be guaranteed; second,
the actual analysis is reasonably inexpensive. The main expense comes
from the fact that to perform the analysis properly the RF sensitivity
of the device in question must be determined, but as was pointed out
earlier, this should also be done in the case of the direct radiation
method. The one exception to this occurs when the circuits are so well
designed from an RF standpoint that it can be demonstrated analytically
that protection levels are so large that the sensitivity of the device
is not a factor after installation in these circuits. The main objec-
tion to the analytic method in its present form is that it can put
unusually stringent restrictions on the circuits so that only the very
well designed systems can be shown to be safe; in other words, the
safety factor afforded thereby can be unreasonably large. In contrast
to the irradiation method, it should be noted that the only positive
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result of the analytical approach is t_ show that a given system is
safe. Specifically, the analysis can not show that a system is
hazardous since the worst case assumptions implicit in the analysis
can never be guaranteed to exist.
l.l General Approach
The procedure for establishing the extent of the RF hazard
to any system by means of the analytic method is as follows:
a. The RF sensitivity of the particular device or devices in
each of the circuits in the system is determined over the entire fre-
quency range of interest, for both continuous wave (CW) and pulsed RF
signals and for all possible modes of damage such as through the regular
leads or between the leads and the case or any other potential damage
mode which exists.
b. Using circuit diagrams, wiring diagrams, observation of
the actual systems, observations and discussions of the handling, in-
stallation and checkout procedures and discussions with the engineers
directly concerned the details of the actual physical systems are
established. These details include such things as length of cables,
locations of wiring breakouts, and separation of distance between firin_
leads and between the firing leads and the ground plane.
c. Mathematical models are constructed which closely resemble
the actual wiring systems, and which can be handled with analytic
techniques. These models are constructed for all phases of the problem;
i.e., handling, installation, check out and installed; and treat cir-
cuits, in the case of EED's for example, for pin-to-pin, pins-to-case
and bridgewire-to-bridgewire effects, as applicable. All known para-
meters of the circuits are used such as the length of unshielded por-
tions, and the physical shape; but wherever a parameter cannot be
properly defined a worst case assumption is made. For example it is
normally assumed that a given circuit is oriented with respect to the
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RF field for maximum pick-up of energy, that the entire circuit is in
a single plane and that all impedances in the circuit are matched for
optimum plck-up and transfer of energy.
d. The mathematical model is analyzed to establish the
amount of RF energy that can be extracted from any incident RF field
and subsequently transferred to the device under consideration, for
example, the EED terminating the circuit. The analysis gives, for a
particular circuit, a quantity known as "aperture" a measure of
ability to pick up energy. The aperture as a function of frequency
plot can be applied to any assumed field intensity.
e. For any assumed field intensity and frequency the amount
of RF energy that could be delivered to the test item is obtained by
the product of the incident power density and the aperture and this
value compared with its RF sensitivity. The degree of potential
hazard is thereby established. Under the assumptions which are made,
an indicated safe condition should be quite safe; an indicated
hazardous condition may or may not be hazardous.
These data are usually presented graphically and in such a
manner that as long as the same circuits and test items are employed,
the analysis can be immediately applied to any change, present or
future, in the incident field desnitles. Only those circuits which are
completely different need be analyzed; for example, in the case of
redundant circuits only one analysis need be conducted if the two cir-
cuits are very similar. In a few rare cases the evaluation of the RF
sensitivity of the device under test can be eliminated. The usual case
occurs when preliminary investigations of the circuits indicates that
they are so well designed from an RF standpoint that only a small amount
of energy can be extracted from even a very strong incident field; then
the sensitivity of the test device may be of secondary importance.
However, RF sensitive EEDs should always be avoided if possible.
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This approach is often designated a "worst case" analysis,
however, it should be noted that this is a mild misnomer. In actual
fact, all of the known or reasonably obtained data bearing upon any
circuit is used. For example, such details as actual sizes of loops,
length of unshielded wire runs, separation distance of cable from frame,
pin configuration of test device, RF sensitivity of test device, im-
pedance of test device, quality of shielding material used and attenua-
tion provided by switches and arming devices used in the circuit are
carefully determined and actual values are used in the calculations
wherever possible. On the other hand, those characteristics which
could be variable from test vehicle to test vehicle or very expensive
to determine are assumed to be at their worst. For example; orienta-
tion of all circuits is assumed to be optimized in the incident field,
impedances throughtout the circuit are generally assumed to be matched
in such a manner as to give maximum transfer of RF energy to the test
device, RF pickup from all loops is assumed to be in phase and missile
skins, except under unusual circumstances, are assumed to offer no
attenuation. Experience has shown this last assumption to be quite
valid.
As a result, the analysis produces values of RF power delivered
to the test device which are always on the conservative side, occasion-
ally by rather large amounts. This leads to the statement made earlier
that if under the worst case approach a system is found to be safe,
it is most likely quite safe; if on the other hand a hazard is in-
dicated, the system may still be safe.
Three additional points should be noted, however. First, ex-
perience has shown that if the missile system is considered across a
wide frequency band there is a good probability that at some point in
the frequency spectrum the worst case assumptions will come close to
being satisfied and the analysis and the real conditions will come
close to coinciding. Second, attempts to assign probability values to
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the worst case assumptions so as to modify the worst case analysis
is extremely difficult to do in any meaningful manner. Even if suffi-
cient data was obtained in one or two systems to permit assignment of
such probabilities, the next system may be so different that practically
all of the former data is not applicable. Third, systems carefully
designed with the RF hazard problem in mind, will generally be shown to
be safe by even this worst case analysis. Only those circuits which
have serious deficiencies in this respect tend to fail and these cir-
cuits should in general be corrected anyway.
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2. DETAILED ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
It is the purpose of this section to describe in detail most
of the mathematical procedures necessary to conduct an RF analysis on
a component. From the start it should be carefully noted that when
analyzing the potential hazard to a component such as an EED every
pertinent aspect of its history must be carefully considered in its own
specific situation. For example, the circuit attached to an EED when
it is installed in a space vehicle may have very different RF pickup
characteristics than the circuit which might be temporarily attached
to check the resistance or some other parameter of the EED. If the EED
is installed in a vehicle with the shorting cap attached and the short-
ing cap is removed to attach the functioning circuit while an RF field
is present, possible RF hazard must be considered for the EED with
shorting cap, without shorting cap and installed in circuit. Should a
monitoring circuit be included in the EED, the RF pickup associated
with this circuit must be considered along with its possible coupling
to the EED functioning circuit. In short, the engineer performing the
analysis must become intimately familar with all aspects of the device,
its associated circuits usually back to the power source and its history
insofar as handling, installation, checkout and final installed con-
dition are concerned.
In addition the engineer must consider all of the possible
functioning modes of a device. For a wire bridge EED this would include
the following: through the bridgewire, between the bridgewire and the
case and between the bridgewires_if applicable.
For each condition, the engineer must characterize the system
as to its most likely manner of acting as a receiving antenna. In its
simplest form one might consider a wire lead EED with its leads twisted
together at the end. This system could probably be most directly
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characterized as a small loop antenna terminated in the bridgewire im-
pedance. The same EED installed in a complex missile circuit may be
much more elusive to characterize, however. A typical configuration
would result in shielding of the cables leading to the EED but no
attachment of the shield to the case of the EED. If single point
grounding of the shield philosophy is also followed, the engineer may
find that a large loop is formed and attached to the pins-to-case mode
of the EED.
In summary, and it cannot be said too strongly, when applying
the analytical techniques discussed here, it is most important to
consider all possible configurations and hazard modes and to character-
ize the systems being considered into their proper paVterns. This step
i8 the single most important and time consuming element of the analysis.
Before proceeding to specific cases a few of the general con-
siderations under which we will operate should be stated. The object
of all of the analyses to be presented here is to determine the maximum
amount of power which can be delivered to any particular failure mode
of the EED or device under consideration. It is assumed that the in-
cident RF field is essentially TEM; i.e., far field. Under these con-
ditions the power density P can be expressed as
P- -l ll 1- - 2 z
g o
o
where
is the power density,
is the electric field,
is the magnetic field,
Zo is the impedance of free space, 377 ohms.
The lines above the letters indicate vector notation.
(2-1)
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With an incident TEM field the basic antenna formulas can be
applied and the hazard expressed in terms of the effective aperture (A)
e
which is defined by
where
W
A e " _ meter2
A - effective aperture (square meters),
e
P - power density, (watts/square meter),
W - power dissipated in the antenna load, the EED, (watts).
This concept of aperture is used in all of our analyses.
where
A general equation (1) for expressing the effective aperture is
v2 RT
A =
e p [(RR + RL + 1_)2 + (X R + XT)2 ]
V - the total voltage induced in the antenna,
_ - radiation resistance,
- loss resistance of the antenna,
- termination resistance,
- termination reactance,
_ - antenna reactance.
This basic equation is used to formulate many of the analyses.
In an actual computation _he effective aperture must be cal-
culated for each frequency of interest using the applicable equations.
If the product of the effective aperture and incident power density at
any given frequency is now formed, the result is the actual RF power
delivered to the EED under the assumed conditions. This value can then
be compared with the sensitivity of the EED at that frequency to estab-
lish the possibility of RF susceptibility.
With respect to specific cases we are concerned with only two
conditions for the EED: disconnected; i.e., not attached to any firing
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or testing circuit; and connected. In the former, we are concerned with
the physical and electrical structure of the EED alone including any
shorting or shielding caps. This would be the normal condition for the
various analyses designated as hand head ' transportation (when the EEDs
are not installed) and installation (before the circuits are attached).
In the latter or connected condition we are concerned with the EED as a
component in an electrical system. This would be the normal condition
whenever the device is installed or during check out or other electrical
testing procedures. It is these two conditions that we will now examine
in more detail.
2.1 EED Disconnected
In order to determine the potential hazard to an EED result-
ing from exposure to an incident RF field during handling and installa-
tion (hand-held mode) it is necessary to analyze the physlcal body of
the initiator in terms of its ability to pick up and deliver energy to
its explosive components. The method of analysis depends heavily upon
the connector type: twin-lead, coaxial or others. Various analytical
methods are available which include similitude to a small loop, a co-
axial aperture, or a circular aperture. In all of these methods, we
assume that the field is essentially TEM or far field. With an in-
cident TEM field, the basic antenna formulas can be applied considering
the initiator or initiator assembly positioned for maximum power pick
up. The various firing modes (pin-to-pln_ pins-to-case and bridgewlre-
to-bridgewire) must also be considered both for continuous wave (CW)
and for pulsed power.
2.l.l Multipin Connector Type
In this section we are concerned with EEDs in which the input
uses some form of the standard type metal shelled, multipin connector.
The analysis applies even if there is only a slngle pin such as in the
coaxial type. Over the years we have developed numerous analysis
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procedures for models in which it was assumed that the model was a co-
axial line; i.e., the pins in the connector are assumed to be the inner
conductor of a coaxial line and the connector body the outer connector,
a two wire end driven line (the connector body if assumed to be removed
and the exposed pins end driven) and a small loop formed by the connector
pins (connector body removed). However, it was determined that the
worst case aperture exists when the axis of the connector on the EED
lies along the direction of propagation of the incident radiation. In
this case we assume that the power delivered to the initiator is not
more than that which would be transmitted through a circular aperture
(of the same diameter as the inside diameter of the pin shield) in an
infinite conducting screen normal to the direction of propagation.
This approach is now used for all connector type EEDs whether shorted
or unshorted and for all excitation modes (pin-to-pin, plns-to-case or
bridge-to-bridge),and while this approach produces a '_orst-worst case"
value of aperture, the values are in general so low that no hazard
exists in reasonable incident RF fields and the overall calculation is
simplified. The clrcular aperture is given by
A "_ A
c wc
where
A - area of the opening of the pin shield in square meters,
Twc" transmission coefficient as given in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1 is a straight line approximation we developed from
the relationship of transmission coefficient to the radius of the cir-
cular aperture which is given in reference (2), page 126.
In practice, for any given frequency we can compute a value
2_
of Ka where K - _-- and a - the radius of the aperture; a and I should
be in the same units. Twc can then be obtained from Figure 2-1 for the
calculated value of Ka and the circular aperture can be calculated from
Equation 2-4. This calculation must be repeated for each frequency of
interest.
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2.1.2 Wire Lead Type
The other most common type of EED which is in usage is the
wire lead type in which the pins to which the bridgewire is applied are
wires which extend through the base plug and are used to make connections
to the EED. These wires may be very short or as long as several feet
although the most common length is 6 to 8 inches. For the EED discon-
nected we are interested in both the shorted and unshorted case.
2.1.2.1 Unshorted Wire Lead Type (Pin-to-Pin)
Figure 2-2 sketches thls type configuration and its antenna
model. This configuration Is also often formed by firing system wiring.
We can evaluate the maximum possible aperture of this configuration by
using (from reference (i))
G_2
A m
em 4_
(2-5)
I
ZPIN-TO- PIN
o
o _5_ZPP
Fig. 2-2 - Unshorted EED and Its Antenna Model
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Here we must compute the gain G of the antenna, where G is defined for
a lossless antenna, (which is clearly necessary for prediction for maxi-
mum aperture) as equal to the directivity D. D in turn is defined by
D m
U
maximum radiation intensity =__m
average radiation intensity U
o
(2-6)
The units of U are watts per square radian and since a sphere contains
47 square radians,
D i
47 U
m
total power radiated
At large values of r we will have TEM propagation and therefore the
Poynting vector will be real and perpencidular to the surface of a
sphere centered at the antenna. Using P as the magnitude of the
r
Poynting vector at a large radius r I and _e definition of Um at radius
rI as
2
- rI P
Umrl rlmax
then
D l
2
47 rI Prlma x
P ds
rI rl
Combining Equations (2-5) and (2-6) gives, for a lossless antenna,
(2-7)
(2-8)
(2-9)
A
A2 r12 p
rlmaX
I
Prl ds
rI
(2-i0)
where rI is a very large radius. The Poyntin8 vector at a large radius
may be computed from Equation (2-I), and we obtain
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A
ax
2 - 1i .
12 rI Z
o (2-11)
2
where I is the current on the antenna and RR is the radiation resistance.
o
I° must be the current actually passing thru RR in the equivalent cir-
cuit. The denominator of Equation (2-10) is the total power radiated
2
and I° RR is also equal to the total power.
If in Equation (2-3), an impedance match is assumed; i.e.,
(_ - RT,RL - 0,xT - -xR)
we obtain
V2
A -A -_
e em 4 PR R
(2-12)
since this must be the maximum aperture. This may be equated to
Equation (2-11), yielding
V 2 .
2
4 P 12 rl 2 IErll max
2
Z I
o o
(2-13)
2
If we now can find IE"r [ max for our configuration we will have found V ,
I dthe induced voltage square . Substitution of this in Equation (2-3)
will then yield
A i
e
4 12 r12 RTl_rll2max
Zo lo 2 [(RR + _ + _)2 + (XR + XT)2]
(2-14)
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If we now maximize Equation (2-13) in relation to the unknowns we ob-
tai.,for_- -XT._- O.h _O,
A m
e
r12l riL2max
2
z I RTo o
(2-15)
and our only unknown is iErllmax. Figure 2-3 shows the configuration
to be evaluated for the E field at a large r. A similar case with a
different phase relationship between the currents has already been ana-
lyzed (3). Substitution of our value of phase difference (i.e., 180 °) in
this analysis yields
/
Z2 i2 £2
IErll 2" ° °12 rl 2 (i - sin 2 _ sin 2 8) sin 2 (28-dcos 8)
where
2_
8 g --I
This expression has a maximum value, at 8 - O, of
Z212 £2
max 12 r12
(2-16)
(2-17)
Substituting this result in Equation (2-5), yields
2
4 Z £
o . sin 2 (28d)
A e -
The above derivation is subject to the restriction that £ << I since we
have considered the currents as linear, whereas they are actually, to
a first approximation at least, distributed sinusoidally along the
(2-18)
wires.
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Fig. 2-3 - Coordinate System Employed in Calculating Electric Field
of the Antenna Configuration
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For £ << l, d < £,
and
sin (2B-d) -* ___d
4_ 2 Z £2 d2 4_r2 Z A 2
O O
A m =
e X2
A can be considered the area of the antenna given by the product of d
and £.
2.].2.2 Shorted Wire Lead Type (Pin-t0-Pin)
The standard method of shorting a wire lead type EED is to
I
twist the ends of the wires together. This forms the leads into a loop
antenna.
On page 171 of Reference (I) it is shown that for a small
loop whose area, A, is less than r2/lO0 the radiation resistance is
glven by:
320 4 A 2 3.12 x 104 A 2
RR= _4 " _4
and that the directivity, D, of the small loop is 3/2. Using the
formula for maximum effective aperture of a lossless antenna (1) ,
2 W
A . D% ffi max
em 4_ P
which is evaluated when the terminating resistance equals the radiation
resistance and the reactances cancel, we can obtain for the induced
voltage
V) 1 -W ---
_ PD_ 2
RR max 47
(2-19)
(2-20)
(2-21)
(2-22)
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P x 4.67 x 104 A 2
Substituting this expression and RL = 0, XR - -X T in Equation (2-3) we
A l
e
obtain
4.67 x 104 A 2
12 (Zz + _R)2
At large A, the 14 term in the expression for the radiation
resistance (Equation 2-20) dominates and the radiation resistance be-
comes very small (for reasonable areas, <0.01 m 2) in relation to the
other resistance in the circuits; we therefore may assume _ = 0.
Using this approximation, Equation (2-24) becomes
4.67 x 104 A 2
A -
e A2
This equation represents the aperture of a small loop assuming a re-
active match between antenna and load, no dissipation of power in the
radiation resistance (which we have seen is very low for small loops),
and orientation of the loop for maximum pickup.
An alternate method of deriving the maximum aperture of a
small loop is to obtain an expression for the voltage induced in the
loop. Consider that the magnetic flux density is uniform over the
loop. The total voltage around the loop is then given by
where
Ivl- - _. ds - A _o _ I_I
A = area of the loop,
= 2_f - 6_ x 108/I,
f - frequency,
= wavelength,
2-13
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_o = permeability of free space, 12.5 x iO 7 h/m,
= magnetic flux density.
If we express IHI 2 in terms of P and Z° from Equation (2-1) and fre-
quency in terms of wavelength and substitute these into the square of
Equation (2-26) we obtain
Ivl2
where
A 2 4 2 p _o c2
Z X2
o
c - fA - 3 x 108 m/sec.
If we now make use of
1 106 u_oc = = 300 x and z - - 377
oE O _
where E
O
as
is the permittivity of free space, we can write Equation 2-27
A 2 4 2 p Z
IVI2 . o . 1.48 x 104 A2P
12 12
(2-27)
(2-28)
Substitution of Equation(2-28) in (2-3) with RL = 0, XR = -X T gives
1.48 x 104 A 2
A -
• x2 + RR)2
(2-29)
Using the assumption that RR - 0 as before, Equation (2-29)
can be rewritten as
4.67 x 104 A 2
A -
e 12
(2-30)
which is identical to Equation (2-25).
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Furthermore, if we now compare this result with Equation
(2-19), the expression for unshorted wire lead configuration, we find
that the two expressions are also identical. Therefore, the effective
aperture for a wire lead EED in the pin-to-pin mode is the same whether
the leads are shorted together or not,lf the physical dimensions are
the same.
2.1.2.3 Wire Lead Type. (Pins-to-Case)
The two preceeding sections discuss the case for pin-to-pin
or "through-the-brldgewire" conditions; however, a plns-to-case
functioning mode is also possible. Figure 2-4 shows a typical EED and
the corresponding antenna equivalent. As shown, the approximation of
this configuration as @n antenna is an end driven short dipole where
the impedance that must be used is
the real part of the pins-to-case
impedance. This must be obtained /
by measurement at the frequencies
of interest. The formula for cal-
culating the maximum power pickup
in this impedance from an end driven
dipole is as follows: |
where
w- IE]2_ 2
Re (Zpc }
(2-31)
Re iZ
pc
",{zpc}
Fig. 2-4 - Antenna Equivalent
Circuit for Wire Lead EED
in Pins-to-Case Mode
W - maximum power in watts,
IEI- magnitude of field density in volts/meter,
ZD - length of dipole in meters,
} = real part of plns-to-case impedance in ohms.
This formula utilizes the fact that the effective height of a
short dipole is its physical length and therefore the total open circuit
voltage in the antenna equivalent circuit will be equal to the magnitude
2-15
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of the electric field times the dipole length.
tion for series impedancesof this model is that the radiation and
terminating impedances have equal and opposite reactances and that the
radiation resistance is zero. From Equation (2-2) it can be seen that
Equation (2-31) can be expressed as an aperture by dividing both sides
by the incident power density (Pi).
A = W__ = tD2 Zq Meter2
e Pi Re(Zpc}
where Zo = impedance of free space in ohms.
M-C2210-I
The worst ease assump-
(2-32)
2.1.2.4 Wire Lead Type (High Frequency Calculations)
In the preceding three sections we have discussed the methods
of analyzing the RF pickup of a wire lead device in all of its various
configurations and hazard modes. However, each of these approaches
has the limitation that the wavelength must be long with respect to the
physical dimensions of the receiving antennas. When the wave length
becomes too short the assumptions which lead to the various calculations
are no longer valid due to non uniform current distribution in the
antennas. For the unshorted loop the shortest applicable wavelength
occurs at A - 20£ where £ is the length of one of the leads. For the
shorted loop the shortest applicable wavelength is A - 2E where £ is
the perimeter of the loop. For the end driven dipole, the shortest
applicable wavelength is A - i0£ D where ED is the length of the dipole.
In each case the equations are valid for any wavelength longer than these
conditions.
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At the short_ wave lengths; i.e., the higher frequencies, the
maximum effective aperture (Aem) can be calculated from
(2-a%)
which holds for a lossless antenna. In this formula A is the maximum
em
possible aperture, assuming a complete impedance match, and D is the
directlvlty of the antenna. Generally, at these higher frequencies the
dlrectlvlty of the actual configuration under consideratlon as a function
of frequency is not known; but if we assume that it can be no more than
that of an antenna of known directivity we can calculate A the maxi-
em '
mum effective aperture.
)
Another reference" , shows curves of directivity for three
types of antennas: the untermlnated rhomblc, the long wire and the
circular loop. It is reasonable to assume that our configuration will
be no more directive than these, since these are among the most direc-
tional linear antennas known.
Figure 2-5 is a composite plot of the greatest directivity of
these antennas types as a function of overall lead length. The plot
was made directly from the above reference. Using Figure 2-5 and
Equation (2-33) the maximum effective aperture of our antenna configura-
tions can be calculated. The maximum effective aperture (Aem) is cal-
culated under the assumption that the lead configuration will be no
more directive than an unterminated rhomblc, a long wire or a circular
loop antenna of equal linear dimension. The calculation is straightfor-
ward.
It is interesting to note at this point the previous deter-
minations for effective aperture (Ae) at the lower frequencies were
calculated with the following assumptions: the terminating bridgewire
resistance is no less than the dc resistance, the antenna is reactively
matched, loss resistance is zero, and the radiation resistance i5 zero.
2-17
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Pig. 2-5 - Haximum Dlrectlvity of Three Known Antenna Configurations
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Note that these last assumptions effectively maximize the A expressione
(see Equation (2-3) where V2 is considered constant). These calculations
contain a seeming anomalysince the effective aperture curve, if con-
tinued, would rise above the maximum effective aperture curve. This is
a result of considering the radiation resistance to be equal to zero in
our maximizing procedure of the effective aperture. If the radiation
resistance were taken into consideration the curves would not intersect
so abruptly but the effective aperture curve would roll over at the
higher frequencies to meet the maximum effective aperture curve.
2.2 EED Connected
The preceding discussions provided the necessary formulas to
I
determine the worst case RF pick up of the majority of EED dis-
connected situations that one is likely to come upon and which would be
applicable for hand-held, installation and transportation considerations.
In turning our attention to the EED connected in its various circuits,
for example installed and checkout, it is important to restate that the
most important and necessary part of the analysis is to properly char-
acterize the antennas represented and that this procedure is consider-
ably more complicated when the EED is connected. However, experience
has shown that the majority of present missile circuits fall into one
of two categories. The first of these is the circuit which contains
breakout of the shields to go to circuit boards, through bulkhead
connectors, to other circuits or at the EED itself. A common occurrence
is for the shielding to terminate Just prior to the EED, for example.
Most of these breakouts can be characterized as loops of varying dimen-
sions. One must pay particular attention to possible pins-to-case loops
in these systems. The second type is the circuit which is completely
shielded from end to end and through 360 °. In this section we will
treat these two possibilities.
2-19
"_THE FRANKUN UqSTFFUTE RESEABCH L.ILIlOI_ILTOH]]E5
M-C2210-I
2.2.1 Circuits with Shielding Caps
Many EED firing systems use shielded cables between the safe/
arm device and the EED, or if no safe/arm unit is used, between the
timers or firing switches and the EED. For such circuits the first
assumption used in arriving at the antenna models to be used is that the
power coupled to the EED firing mode impedances through the braided
shield of the cables is negligible in relation to that coupled to these
impedances by the non-shielded portions of the wiring. In consequence
the models chosen represent the physical characteristics of the gaps or
breaks in the shielding. Figure 2-6 diagrams a typical break or gap
in a shielded firing lead and Figure 2-7 diagrams the equivalent antenna
model used for this gap. The dimensions given are representative of
commonly used separation switches.
The impedances Z and Z are considered to be completely un-
uI u 2
and Z represent the firing mode impedances (Zpp andknown while Zpp t pct
Zpc) of the EED transformed along the connecting lines to the separation
switch. The models for pin-to-pin and pins-to-case pickup are thus seen
to be, for the lower frequencies at least, small loops loaded with the
indicated impedance. We further assume that the transmission lines
formed by the shielded cables that connect the gaps and the EED are loss-
less. This is to be expected since these cables are constructed of good
conductors and good insulators. In addition we have made measurements
on many typical types of two wire twisted shielded cable in the low fre-
quency ranges and although attenuation is not zero it is usually small for
the lengths of cable considered in these ranges. The only worst case assump-
tion that can be made, without extensive and expensive measurements, is that
the loss is zero.
Once the loop has been reduced to its diagrammatic representa-
tion as shown in Figure 2-7, the aperture for this loop can be calculated
from the same equations as developed before. For wavelengths up to twice the
perimeter of the loop, Equation (2-25) applies. For shorter wavelengths
Equation (2-33) applies.
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Fig. 2-6 - A Typical Shielding Gap Configuration
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t -- 1 cm 5.08 cm
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ZPCT
Fig. 2-7 - Basic Antenna Model for a Shielding Gap
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A
e
4.67 x 104 A 2
DX 2
A - --
em 47
(2-25)
(2-33)
The above methods allow us to predict the maximum possible
aperture of a single loop across the frequency range of interest. If
more than one loop exists in the same firing circuit the composite
aperture of the combined loops is obtained, at all frequencies such that
2£ < l, from
Q
4.67 x 104
Aec " _ _ mX2 (A1 + A 2 + A 3 + ...+ A + ... + An)
(2-34)
where Aec is the composite effective aperture of n loops and Am is the
area of the mth loop. This result reflects the fact that the methods
employed in this frequency range are based on a maximum voltage and since
the voltage contributions of the individual loops could add in phase,
we must consider this worst case possibility. In fact, at the lower
frequencies where the wavelengths could be considerably longer than the
circuit considered, this is a distinct possibility.
At the higher frequencies such that 2£ _ _ a similar procedure
must be used, here the composite aperture is calculated from
( Jq C- + + ...+ AemAec q (2-35)
where Aem is the maximum aperture of the qth gap and Aec is the com-
posite aperture.
Figure 2-8 shows the pln-to-pln aperture computed by the above
methods for a small shielding gap in a 6.4 ohm (dc resistance) EED
firing circuit. The geometry of the gap is shown on the figure.
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The case where circuits are completely shielded with no gaps
is comparatively rare and it should be noted immediately that when this
is done there is rarely any RF hazard problem involved wlth such cir-
cuits. However, it is sometimes necessary to demonstrate by analysis
that such is the case.
Since in such a system the shields completely enclose the EED,
shorting switch, power supply and interconnecting wires, the analysis
can be broken into the following parts:
i. Determining the total power into the outer surface
of the shield as a function of frequency and of
the incident fleld assuming matched conditions
inside the shield.
2. Determining the total power loss of the shield
assuming matched conditions inside the shield.
3. Using the results of steps one and two to cal-
culate the maximum possible power that can be
delivered to the EED as a function of frequen-
cy and incident field, assuming the EED to be
installed in the longest firing circuit.
4. Comparing the results of step three to a com-
posite O.IZ firing level that is the minimum
0.1Z level for all the EEDs under considera-
tion for any firing mode.
Dividing the analysis into the parts given above implies the
assumption that the field that is reradiated by any structure within
the shield or by the boundary between the inner surface of the shield
and the region internal to the shield will, at the outer surface of
the shield, be very small in relation to the field induced on the outer
surface by the incident radiation. A worst case approach which insures
the above is to assume that all power that penetrates the shield is
perfectly matched to the EED. If this were the case, there would be no
reflection from either the shleld/internal region boundary or any
2-24
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internal structure. _e may further assume that the power that penetrates
the shield can be matched to any of the firing modes' impedances.
2.2.2.1 Calculation of the Maximum Power Density at the Outer Surface
of the Braided Shield
As a start toward determining the maximum power density at
the surface of the braid, we assume that the entire surface of the
cable is illuminated by a TEM field at normal incidence and the field
has a power density Pi" We realize that generation of such a field
(normal to an irregular convex surface) is well nigh impossible, but it
is surely the worst case TEM field assumption. The maximum power
density (PT) at the surface of the shield is given by
PT " Pi (i - IpI2) (2-36)
where
PT is the power density at the surface of the braid,
Pi is the incident TEM field power density,
Z - Z
c o
P =Z +Z '
C O
Z = 377 ohms,
o
Zc = (i + J) x 2.59 x i0 -4 _ = the surface impedance of
a copper sheet in ohms,
fM]iz = frequency in megahertz.
If we note that Re {Z } - Im {Z } << Z we can write Equation
c c o
(2-36) as
4 Re {Z }
c
PT = PI Z " Pi
o
x 2.75 x 10 -6 _MHz (2-37)
with negligible error. It can be shown that this equation provides a
worst case estimate of surface power density.
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Calculation of the Power Density at the Inner Surface of the
Braided Shield
Power passes through the shield by two separate paths: propa-
gation through the copper ribbon of the braid and propagation through
the interstices. The loss in the metallic path is a dissipative attenua-
tion, and that produced by the small holes is due to reflection. The
copper loss can be evaluated by the planar attenuation which is
dB - 8.68 _
6
where t is the thickness of the braid and 6 is the skin depth. The
Justification of the use of planar attenuation instead of the attenua-
tion of the curved surface of the @hield can be found on page 248 of
reference O)where it is shown that as long as the radius of the cable
divided by the skin depth is more than 7.55, the planar approximation
leads to very small errors. If we use the minimum thickness of the
ribbon that makes up the braid as t and calculate _ for copper we ob-
rain
dBcopper 5 z
where fMBz is frequency in megahertz.
The attenuation of the small holes can be computed from that
of a waveguide operating below cutoff frequency. From page 346 of
reference _),we obtain, for a cutoff rectangular guide
where
c
is the attenuation in nepers per unit length,
is the cutoff wavelength of the guide,
C
is the free space wavelength of the propagating
energy.
The applicable cutoff wavelength is given by
2-26
(2-38)
(2-39)
(2-40)
_FR_ INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES
M-C2210-I
X = 2b
c
where b is the largest dimension of a rectangular guide.
to nepers gives
dB = 8.68at
Converting
(2-4].)
(2-42)
where t is the thickness of the shield.
Since the power density at the surface of the shield has been
assumed constant and since the ratio of open to solid area of the shield
can be determined, a symbolic equation can be written for the average
power density out of the inner surface of the shield. If Po is the
average power density at the inner surface of the cable, PT is the
outer surface power density and Q is the ratio of solid area to hole
area in the shield.
Po = (l-Q) PT [down 8.68at dB] + QPT [down 8.6_ dB] (2-43)
It should be noted that shielded cable varies greatly in con-
struction and quality and to apply the above system it is necessary to
carefully investigate the shield in question to determine thickness,
material and ratio of hole area to solid area. General construction
should also be noted.
It is now possible at any one frequency to use Equation (2-36)
and Equation (2-43) to establish the maximum amount of RF power arriving
at the inside of the shield in terms of the RF field incident upon the
cable. If this is now adjusted for the total area of cable exposed,
the total maximum RF power inside the shield will have been determined.
By our original assumptions all of this power is assumed to be _elivered
to the EED. For consistency we could construct a symbolic aperture
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equation as follows:
where
Aem = _Pi " PqA l-Q)PT[dOwn 8.68at dB] + QPT[dOwn 8.6
A is the total surface area of the cable.
(2-44)
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SHORT|NG CAP
TAPEO TOGETHER
....--"_ZI-I_.......-_ I ,c.
_------_'-_-,"......._ t
_._TWISTED, SINGLE SHIELDED PAIR
DETONATOR
Fig. 3-I - Schematic Drawing of System to be Analysed
APPROXIMATE AREA OF LOOP = 9.5 CM z
PERIMETER OF LOOP _: 38 CM
Fig. 3-2 - Loop Approximation of System Shown in Fig. 3-!
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3. EXAMPLE OF AN EVALUATION
Figure 3-1 is a schematic drawin E of a simple system configura-
tion actually used on a space vehicle. FiEure 3-2 is an approximation
of this confiEuration shown as a simple loop and finally Figure 3-3
shows the antenna confiEura-
tion for analysis derived
from the actual circuit.
Rdc is the de resistance of
the initiator.
Roc = 1.4 1"1
2AREA : 9.5 CM
PERIMETER : 38CM
While this is an
Fig. 3-3 - Antenna Configuration
installed mode, the final for Evaluation Derived
antenna confiEuration is a from Fig. 3-2
sinEle loop. Therefore Equation (2-25) can be used to compute the
aperture for all wave lenEths up to A - 2 times the perimeter of the
loop, i.e., for all wave lenEths up to 76 cm or a frequency of 395 MHz.
Above this frequency Equation (2-33) is used. For each frequency of
interest, and sufficient frequencies should be chosen to define the
curve, one must calculate an aperture usin E the appropriate equation.
FiEure 3-4 is a plot of such calculations made for the circuit under
consideration here.
The final step consists of using this aperture versus fre-
quency data to produce a plot of RF power received at the EED as a func-
tion of the RF field incident on the system and to compare this RF
plck-up with the RF sensitivity of the EED established by testing.
Figure 3-5 shows such a plot where the incident P_ power density was
assumed to be 2 watts/meter 2 up to 50 MHz and i00 watts/meter 2 above
50 MHz. The data for this plot was obtained by multiplying chosen
points on the aperture curve of FiEure 3-4 by the assumed incident
power density at the same point. Superimposed on the power pick-up
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curve of Figure 3-5 is the RF sensitivity curve of the EED used in the
installation. The conclusion one would draw from this plot is that
should this system be exposed to I00 watts meter 2 fields across the
frequency spectrum from 10 M}{z to 105 MHz safety could be guaranteed
on the basis of the analysis only from 10 MHz to 80 MHz and from
approximately 1600 MHz to 8500 MBz.
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4. SUMMARY
As indicated in the beginning of this monograph there has
been no attempt to be exhaustive in coverage since it is almost im-
possible to predict all of the possible circuit characteristics that
one may be faced with in any given analysis. However, our experience
has shown that most problems fall into the general categories discussed
here. We have not touched on the special case of near field, for ex-
ample, nor have we considered devices other than wire bridge type EEDs.
It should be apparent, however, that the general philosophy and methods
of approach can be used for any type of field, any type of circuit and
component. In general_ to apply the technique three conditions must be
met:
a) Knowledge of all of the failure modes for the component
being considered and the RF levels that will cause failure or degrada-
tion of these components.
b) Proper construction of a mathematical model which
accurately simulates the actual circuits involved so that the system
connected to the device in question can be characterized in terms of
a workable RF receiving antenna. Once again it is essential to consider
all possible failure modes.
c) Proper application of electromagnetic theory principles
to this model.
No one part of this sequence can be taken lightly since a
failure to properly conduct any one part could cause a failure of the
entire approach. To be successful the engineer must be painstaking and
methodical in his approach and must accept no unsupported heresay re-
garding any elements of the device or circuits.
It should be remembered that, properly applied, the snalysis
approach is only semi worst case and every attempt should be made in
4-1
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constructing the model to use actual conditions wherever possible. Note
that in a very general way the analytical approach can prove that a
circuit is safe, but cannot always prove that a system indicated to be
in trouble is really unsafe. In contrast the field test approach can
only show that a system is in trouble and cannot prove that a system is
absolutely safe.
In conclusion Table 4-I summarizes the conditions and equa-
tions we have presented in this monograph.
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Throughout this monograph reference is made to various
functioning modes of EEDs. While it is not the purpose of this docu-
ment to present a comprehensive picture of EED's behavior under RF ir-
radiation a brief discussion should help clarify the situation.
A standard EED normally contains a transducer to which
electrical energy can be applied. Some of this energy is usually con-
verted to heat which in turn initiates the explosive mix next to the
transducer. It is in this manner that EEDs are normally designed to
operate and this is what we have designated as the pin-to-pin mode.
However, there are other modes in which an EED can be caused to fire
which were not planned in the original design. The most common such
mode is designated plns-to-case.
In this mode an electrical signal impressed between the pins
leading to the normal transducer and the case of the EED can cause a
voltage breakdown or some other disruptive phenomena directly through
the explosives between the brldgewlre posts and the case. This mode
is frequently overlooked but is of vital interest in the case of irra-
diation by RF and spurious electrostatic potentials.
In addition some EEDs contain an additional circuit either to
permit monitoring of proper connection or to support a redundant trans-
ducer. In this case, in a manner similar to the pins-to-case phenomena,
signals can appear between the two circuits and once again directly
across the explosive mix. This is the bridge-to-brldge mode.
Frequently, when a group is considering the possibility of RF
hazard in connection with an EED the assumption is made that the RF
sensitivity of the EED can be characterized as no greater than the dc
no fire level, or, in some more conservative cases, to be no greater
than an arbitrarily chosen 6 db below the no fire level. The reasoning
behind this seems to stem from the concept that the RF probably heats
up the transducer in the same manner as dc. Were it not for the other
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modes this assumption would be reasonably valid at least over part of
the frequency spectrum. Experience gained in performing RF sensitivity
tests on over 75 different EEDs has indicated that up to approximately
I000 MHz and for RF applied directly to the normal transducer, i.e.,
pin-to-pin, the functioning sensitivity of hot wire type EEDs is no
greater than the dc constant current sensitivity for long pulses of i0
seconds or more duration. However, RF signals applied between the pins
and the case or between dual bridgewlres may frequently produce sensi-
tivities much greater than the dc sensitivity over the frequency range.
Above I000 MHz, and particularly when pulsed RF signals are applied,
the sensitivity may be greater than dc in all modes including through
the bridgewlre. In many cases this sensitivity is increased by con-
siderabely more than the 6 dB safety factor sometimes used, and since
the pins-to-case and brldge-to-brldge mode have very little to do with
the normal functioning mode, insensitivity to dc signals in the normal
firing mode (pin-to-pin) is no protection. Many 1 ampere -1 watt de-
vices are more sensitive in the plns-to-case mode than EEDs designed
to be considerably more sensitive in the normal functioning mode.
On the other side of the ledger many EEDs are far less
sensitive to KF than they are to dc particularly in the pin-to-pln mode.
In these cases assumption of the dc level as the sensitivity could so
severely penalize the evaluation of the EED circuits as to make ac-
ceptable circuits appear quite hazardous.
All of these pitfalls can be avoided by adequate RF testing
of the EEDs. Procedures and equipment are available which permit
accurate determination of the amount of RF power required to be deliver-
ed to an EED in any functioning mode to produce functioning or degrading.
The expense of the hardware required for such tests is frequently a
deterrent, but more often than not it is false economy to avoid this
step.
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While the analysis procedures discussed in this monograph
assume that the magnitude of the incident RF field is already known it
is frequently necessary for the engineer to make some Judgments of this
field himself. A classical case of this occurs when several RF sources
exist at or near the same frequency andwhile an incident field can be
calculated for each source, the question arises as to the effect of all
of the sources combined.
It can be shown that the worst case average power absorbed
(PA) by a given load from n sources at the same frequency is given by
where P is the power supplied by the qth source with other sources
q
quiescent and when the phase angles of the individual sources are
chosen to maximize the simultaneous absorbed power. The use of the
above equation as a worst case condition should be limited, however, to
continuous wave sources of precisely the same frequencies. If the
frequencies differ by even a small amount and average power (PA) is
defined as
PA limit 1 -Iq= -- PI dt
q_®q o
(B-l)
(B-2)
where PI is the instantaneous simultaneous power, then the worst case
average power is given by
PA " P1 + P2 + P +'' "+ Pq n
(B-3)
where P is defined as before.
q
This equation is a worst case condition for either continuous
wave or pulsed sources of differing frequency and in addition is in-
dependent of the starting times of individual pulses of the pulsed
sources.
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The technique of combining power densitities for closely
spaced frequencies and then predicting worst case possible hazard at
the widely spaced frequency groups so obtained is founded on the
assumption that the worst case conditions assumed in the pickup analy-
sis will not occur more than once in the entire frequency band of
interest. Due to the complicated frequency dependence of many of the
parameters that are worst case approximated we believe this assumption
to be conservative. The alternative to this technique is to combine
power densities at all frequencies and use this result throughout the
frequency range of interest. In our Judgement this technique is overly
conservative.
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One approach to determining the extent of RF vulnerability of
a system is to place the system in question in the fields of various
RF transmitters and to observe the effects produced on the system com-
ponents. This technique has been extensively applied to missile systems
containing firing circuits terminated in electroexplosive devices (EEDs)
but the basic technique is applicable to circults containing components
other than EEDs. If the data obtained are to be anything more than
go/no-go information for the particular RF field intensity used it is
necessary to put detectors in plaae of the components being evaluated;
these detectors must give an indlcatlon of the amount of RF energy
delivered to the compo_en=. In general this approach to hazard deter-
mination is particularly appeal_ng because it is direct and appears to
be a test which closely approxlmates the actual conditions which would
exist in a operational situation. However, in most cases the technique
falls somewhat short of the ideal.
Among the major problems in using this technique is the ex-
tension of information received on one system to other systems of the
same type. The number of more or less uncontrollable variables makes
any generalized correlation very difficult. For example, determination
, %
of the actual RF field incident on a given circuit at the time of test
can be very difficult since envlro_mental factors can greatly influence
localized field strengths and varlatlon of circuit orientation and cir-
cuit design from test vehicle to test vehicle can present a problem.
Frequently, this situation is handled by using an arbitrary safety
factor in connection with the results; in a sense, "worst casing" the
field tests.
A more definitive problemgrows out of the same problem that
was discussed in the notes on EED sensitivity; i.e., the detectors used
in the field tests consider only the pln-to-pln mode and are calibrated
on the basis of dc sensitivity and with dc signals only.
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There are two steps that can be taken to alleviate this prob-
lem. A full determination of the RF sensitivity of the devices under
consideration removes any doubt involved in making inferences from dc
values, and provides the information needed for precise calibration of
the detector with RF signals in terms of sensitivity as a function of
frequency, obviously preferable to assuming a sensitivity based on
brldgewire heating. In addition it is possible to build detectors
which will give some measure of the sensitivity in the pins-to-case mode
or other modes; this would permit detection of the possibility of initia-
tions in these modes. There are still_ however, many questions to be
answered about such detector_; and they can be used only if carefully
calibrated in terms of the information obtained in the RF sensitivity
e
evaluation of the EEDs themselves.
Programs are continuing in this field to solve these problems
and others, and the situation is continually being improved. As in
nearly any other approach to the RF problem, the technique can be
valuable if one fully understands the limitations and properly qualifies
the data obtained.
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Basically, there are three general methods commonly used to
minimize the RF hazard to EED systems: Use of components less sensitive
to RF; proper design of circuits; and use of RF filters. The first of
these is somewhat out of control of the circuit designer. While it is
possible to lower the RF susceptibility of an EED circuit by using less
sensitive EEDs most manufacturers have as yet done comparatively little
work on this phase particularly with respect to hazard modes other than
pin-to-pin. Furthermore, most approaches to lowering the RF sensitivity
in the pin-to-pin mode also make the EED considerably less sensitive to
normal functioning signals thereby requiring larger power sources with
increased weight. However-, to the extent that he can, a designer should
select EEDs that have no marked RF sensitivity.
The most straightforeward and certain protection can be gained
by properly designing the circuits to minimize the RF hazard. In general
this means that firing circuits should be separate from other circuits,
wires should be twisted pairs, all circuits should be shielded end to
end and through 360 ° and the shields should be grounded at as many
places as possible. There are many specification documents that go
into considerable detail on the proper design of EED circuits. However,
in actual practice the designer often finds it difficult to comply with
all of the requirements. The physical layout and the complexity of
the system often force him to break the shields. Furthermore the wiring
philosophy is often in conflict with other philosophies. The primary
example of this is the multiple point grounds versus the single point
ground philosophy. And yet the single point ground combined with dis-
continuous shields frequently leads to large plns-to-case RF pickup
problems.
The third solution is the use of RF filters. Ideally these
filters should be broadband, very light and small and should not affect
the EED's dc firing characteristics. In addition, the filter should
in no way compromise system reliability. The optimum solution would
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have the filter as an intLgral part of the EED; however this is not
very common. It is more common to mount the filter separately but
close to the EED. When this is done the wiring between the filter and
the EED must be completely shielded.
While RF filters are a valid solution to the problem, the
designer must be certain that the filter is capable of accomplishing
the task he desires. To do this he must be certain of the information
on the filters. The parameter of major interest is attenuation as a
function of frequency. Frequently filter values are quoted in terms
of insertion loss which has meaning only in the specific measuring
system used. What is worse, occasionally attenuation, or true loss,
is used interchangeably with the term insertion loss. If the designer
is uncertain of how published data was obtained and is unable to find
out, he should make certain the proper tests are performed.
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